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Transitions without Transitional Justice in 
Asia
Sung Chull Kim
This article addresses the underexplored question of why some state violence cases 
in Asia are not followed by transitional justice even during a democratic transition. 
It explicates the two factors that obstruct or delay seeking truth and accountability 
and thus bring impunity for perpetrators. One is the context in which the violence 
took place, and the other is longevity of the violent regime. If the violence occurs 
during a period of conflation of state construction and regime building, and if the 
perpetrators’ power persists long enough to be institutionalized, transitional justice 
is least likely to take place. Five cases of violence violence which were committed by 
anticommunist regimes during the Cold War in four Asian countries are explored.
Keywords   context of violence, longevity of regime, transitional justice, democratic  
    transition, state construction, regime building
Introduction
Incidents of state violence in Asia that occurred under military authoritarian 
rule during the Cold War have begun to receive public and academic attention 
over the last three decades. Some cases have gone through resolution processes, 
including truth-finding, to deal with accountability, awards of compensation, 
trials, amnesty, or a combination of all or some of these aspects. But other cases 
have never been resolved. What demands our particular attention is that these 
unresolved cases took place in countries that are experiencing democratization. 
For instance, there has been no progress in bringing to justice the perpetrators 
of the mass killings that took place during the Korean counterinsurgency 
operations at the end of 1940s and the early 1950s on Jeju island, the Indonesian 
counterinsurgency in the 1960s, and the Thai “red drum” killings in Phatthalung 
area in the early 1970s, despite significant progress in democratization later on in 
these countries.
What is the relationship between transitional justice for past state violence 
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and democratic transition? It is difficult to generalize the cause-and-effect 
relationship; however, it is fair to say that democratic transition from authoritarian 
rule—or the democratization process—involves various political changes which 
create a friendly environment for transitional justice and the resolution of past 
violence. 
The notion of democratic transition is more inclusive than that of transitional 
justice, although democratic transition per se does not necessarily bring about 
transitional justice. Democratic transition involves a regime change, including 
substantive political changes moving in a democratic direction. One of the 
most important initial steps toward democracy is a power shift either through 
an unprecedentedly fair election or through a pact between the ruler and the 
opposition. Democratic transition is mostly a toilsome process whereby a new 
regime has to phase out legacies and practices that the outgoing oppressive regime, 
and preceding repressive regimes, must leave behind: violence, surveillance, 
secrecy, election fraud, corruption, censorship, abuse of power, distrust, etc. The 
speed and length of the process of democratic transition depends on various 
factors such as balance of power, international pressure, and the diffusion effect. 
Transitional justice, which is expected to take place in this transitional period, 
deals with the past violence and human rights abuses, whether they happened 
under the outgoing oppressive regime or preceding regimes. 
It is also worth noting that democratic transition is not the only notion that 
is associated with transitional justice. Post-conflict peacebuilding may harness 
transitional justice. Witnessing the mass violence in Rwanda, Yugoslavia, and 
Cambodia, observers have paid special attention to transitional justice as one of 
the many subjects of institutionalizing and consolidating peace in post-conflict 
societies (Jeffery and Kim 2014, 3-8). Transitional justice in this context is part of 
the broader process of the establishment of peace. Transitional justice proceeds 
along with other peacebuilding efforts such as disarmament and rehabilitation of 
ex-soldiers, development aid, national and local elections, etc. Inasmuch as post-
conflict peacebuilding is assisted by, and sometimes initiated by, the international 
community, transitional justice is normally on the menu of the international 
projects. Most cases of transitional justice in peacebuilding are not self-generating 
in the conflict-torn societies but facilitated, financed, and staffed by international 
actors (for critical studies, see Sriram 2007; Peou 2014).
In contrast, democratic transition from authoritarian rule is basically a 
domestically-generated change, even if the change in some cases is prodded 
by international support or pressure. Thus “transitions without transitional 
justice”—which I dub here to highlight a discrepancy between democratic 
transition and transitional justice—necessitates addressing the question of why 
some cases of democratic transition do pass by the past violence without enacting 
truth-finding missions to ensure accountability. This question is legitimated 
because democratization usually supposes the admission of old wrongdoings and 
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establishment of human rights, as well as institutionalization of civilian rules and 
procedures. 
Acknowledging the above-mentioned difference of the context between the 
post-conflict peacebuilding and transition from non-democratic rule, this article 
examines the reasons for the cases of the absence of transitional justice in the 
democratic transition. The purpose of this article is to uncover the causal sources 
that cancel out a possibility of justice at the time of democratic transition. The 
central argument of this article is: if violence occurs during a period of conflation 
of state construction and regime building, and if the perpetrators’ power (and 
the repressive regime’s power) persists long enough for it to be institutionalized, 
efforts to find truths and ensure accountability regarding the past violence will 
encounter difficulties even if they take place during the democratization process.
The article selects five Asian cases of violence: Imperial Japan’s mass suicide/
killing of its own citizens (1945), two Korean cases of state violence (1947-1954, 
and 1980), the Indonesian mass killings during the counterinsurgency operations 
(1965-1968), and Thailand’s “red drum” killings (1971-1975). The rationale 
of the selection is that, first, in all of the cases, violence was committed by 
anticommunist regimes and justified by the Cold War divide; second, each case 
is representative in terms of scale of violence, ramifications, and socio-political 
impact; third, the violence was, at least, addressed in one way or the other during 
the democratic transition, whether transitional justice was satisfactory to the 
victims or obstructed for any reasons; finally, because of the above-mentioned 
rationale, these cases have some implications for analytical and empirical 
examinations of cases in other regions. 
My analysis of the two factors with regard to transitional justice might 
be applied to cases in Latin America or even in the process of post-conflict 
peacebuilding, but I limit my analysis to those Asian cases due to the limitations 
of my knowledge and space considerations. 
The article, first, begins by raising a conceptual question of why some cases 
of democratic transition pass by past violence; second, explicates in detail two 
factors which obstruct or delay transitional justice during democratic transition; 
third, examines the five cases through the conceptual lenses; and finally, draws a 
conclusion.    
Conceptual Question: Why Do Democratic Transitions Pass by Past 
Violence?
By definition, transitional justice is the confronting of the wrongdoings of 
previous repressive regimes particularly in times of political transition (Teitel 
2003). Transitional justice involves various judicial and non-judicial measures 
that address human rights abuses. Measures to be taken include reparations, 
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truth-finding commissions, prosecution and trials, amnesty, pardon, 
reconciliation, and institutional reforms. For an analytic purpose, however, this 
article limits the scope of the definition. Here transitional justice is narrowly 
defined by emphasizing truth-finding and accountability as the core components. 
Transitional justice involves, first, seeking truths about the violence (particularly 
the perpetrators’ act) and, second, demanding and ensuring accountability 
(acceptance of responsibility for the result of violence). Truth-finding may take 
place either during prosecution and trial or through a truth-finding commission; 
and accountability may be demanded and ensured either in the judicial process, 
through the truth-finding commission, or through a reconciliation commission. 
This article emphasizes both finding truth and ensuring accountability, regardless 
of the formality of the measures in which the two crucial elements are instituted. 
Pardon or amnesty is the step that must follow truth-finding and accountability. 
That is, they may be part of the process of achieving transitional justice at a later 
stage, but truth-finding and accountability must precede it. By definition in this 
article, truth-finding and accountability are a necessary condition of successful 
transitional justice. 
There is a body of literature that examines the question of how transitional 
justice takes place, whereas there have been no such efforts to address the question 
of why a democratic transition addresses or does not address past violence. On 
the question of how, there are explanations on the two approaches of transitional 
justice: the punitive approach to punish offenders, and the reconciliatory 
approach to integrate perpetrators into the new society (Amstutz 2006, 165-68). 
In detail, advocates of retributive justice focus more on trial more so than other 
measures such as repentance, reparation, pardon, or amnesty. Only after dealing 
with the issue of whom to punish and what to punish can reconciliation between 
the perpetrators, on the one hand, and the victims and the society more broadly, 
on the other, be justified. Retributive justice is less concerned with order and 
harmony in the new society than the price of the crimes against human rights. 
There is little room for forgiveness of the perpetrators and their reintegration into 
society (Bell and Campbell 2004). 
Restorative or reconciliatory justice prioritizes a transformative effect in 
relation to victims, perpetrators, and the society as a whole. It focuses on the 
gradual achievement of justice: ideally speaking, it should start with truth-finding 
through a truth commission and then move to either trial or amnesty on a case 
by case basis. That is, restorative justice, while seeking truths and demanding 
accountability, ends up with forbearance and social unity, and for this reason it is 
frequently called reconciliatory justice. Restorative justice for past violence aims 
at attitudinal or behavioral change by offenders, thus reintegrating them into 
a new society. Restorative justice presupposes mutual respect and recognition 
between previous enemies and requires recognition of the dignity of others; in 
this regard, it is considered a holistic approach (Boraine 2006). But this holistic 
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approach also has its limitations in the real world. If the transformative effect is 
overemphasized, then the resolution of past violence is likely to become a soft 
option without extensive truth-finding and accountability (Ashworth 2002; 
Verdeja 2009, 3; Lutz and Reiger 2009, 275-93).
Whichever approach a transitional society may adopt in the transitional 
period, seeking truths and demanding accountability are the core components. 
Neither approach allows impunity particularly through blind amnesty. The main 
difference is that retributive justice is teaching, whereas restorative justice is 
transformative. Retributive justice technically focuses on punishing perpetrators 
and imparting the lesson of stern rule of law on violence, whereas restorative 
justice aims at transforming the relationship between perpetrators and victims 
and intends to build institutions of justice (Kritz 1995; Marshall 1999; Abu-Nimer 
2001; Cho 2007; Lundy and McGovern 2008). 
What has mattered in this discussion about the two approaches is not 
an issue of moral superiority or inferiority, but the question of preference, or 
frequency, in the real world. Indeed, a flourishing number of case studies, focused 
on the approaches of transitional justice, have demonstrated that a majority of 
the cases of dealing with the past wrongdoings ended up with restorative justice 
(Amstutz 2006, 153; Philpott 2006; Clarke 2009; Parent 2010). Using collected 
data, Olsen, Payne, and Reiter (2010) have made some of the most useful 
generalizations about conditions and paths of transitional justice: first, length of 
the authoritarian legacy matters; second, the economic situation affects the choice 
of mechanisms such as trial, amnesty, truth commission, etc.; and third, the form 
of transition affects the choice of mechanism. They have argued that so-called 
balanced justice—a combination of the mechanisms of both retributive justice 
and reconciliatory measures—contributes to the strengthening of democracy and 
human rights in times of transition. Their analysis empirically proves a middle 
ground of the two competing scholarships regarding transitional justice: the 
punitive justice based on legalism and the restorative justice based on pragmatism 
(for the competing scholarship, see Vinjamuri and Snyder 2004).  
Other scholars have delved into the question of what determines the 
approach or path in detail—ether trials or non-judicial track. Skaar (1999) 
has focused on balance of power between the outgoing elite and the public 
in the new regime. The more power the public in the new regime holds, the 
higher the chance of trials; and the truth commission is a choice when power is 
balanced between the two. In a similar vein, Duthie (2009) and Fernandez-Torne 
(2017, 15-26) have paid special attention to the role of civil society in the truth 
commission formation, reparation programs, and tribunals. As opposed to these 
scholars’ concentration on domestic forces, Kim (2012) and Hirsch (2014) have 
explored and proved empirically the international impact, that is, transnational 
networks and diffusion of norms. 
The above-mentioned discussions have focused on the conditions or 
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determinants of diverging approaches and paths in transitional justice. Despite 
their own merits, they have missed addressing the question of why some 
states experiencing democratic transition do not undergo transitional justice, 
particularly proper truth-finding and accountability. That is, the independent 
variables of those unfortunate cases have not been identified. 
If democratic transition is proved not to be a sufficient condition for 
transitional justice, it would be natural for us to delve into further questions that 
are related to the period prior to democratic transition. Suggestive questions are: 
how violence was dealt with prior to the transitional period, and, tracing back 
to the time of violence, in what context the violence took place and what the 
perpetrators intended with it. These questions involve identifying the original 
context of violence and the violent regime’s (or successor regime’s) handling of the 
past. The first one pertains to identifying the context, and the second concerns 
the post-violence period. I fill this knowledge gap by explicating two factors that 
act as impediments to seeking truths and ensuring accountability in some Asian 
cases. One factor is the conflation of state construction and regime building, and 
the other factor is the relative longevity of the regime that committed the violence 
or its successor regime (see Table 1). 
As for the first factor, I bear in mind that many post-colonial Asian 
countries have undergone competition and struggle among groups with different 
ethnic, religious, and/or ideological backgrounds during the critical period of 
constructing an independent state and a new regime simultaneously. This kind 
of conflation of state construction and regime building is associated with the 
particular nature of violence, and the mass killings committed in this period are 
addressed later. The violence is categorical and uncompromising in nature, and it 
is directly related to the foundation of the state as well as legitimacy of the first-
ever regime. As to the second factor, which is not necessarily connected to the 
first factor, I bear in mind that the duration of the violent regime is normally 
followed by legitimation of that brutal act and elimination of the collective 
memory about it.  
Table 1 shows that if the two factors are combined, a transitional society 
dealing with past violence finds itself facing the worst outcome: “obstructed 
transitional justice,” in which the efforts for finding truth are blocked or aborted 
Table 1. Likelihood of Transitional Justice
Conflation of State Construction and Regime Building
Yes No
Duration of Violent 
Regime 
Long Obstructed TJ Unsuccessful TJ
Short Unsuccessful TJ Successful TJ
Source: Author
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for different reasons in each case. If one of the two factors is at work, a transitional 
society will face “unsuccessful transitional justice,” in which truth-finding 
efforts are not welcomed and thus accountability is hard to achieve. “Successful 
transitional justice” is likely to occur when the following conditions are met: the 
violence did not take place in the period of conflation of state construction and 
regime building, and the violent regime is short-lived, for example, less than 
about thirty years. In this article, a thirty-year span, which is normally considered 
one biological generation, is a baseline point of dividing long-lived regimes from 
short-lived ones. 
Conflation of State Construction and Regime Building
From an analytical point of view, state construction differs from regime building, 
but there has not been a sustained study on this topic. State construction involves 
the expansion of power over territory and diverse social elements, as well as the 
establishment of apparatuses and institutions, whereas regime building consists 
of the establishment of rules and orders regarding the relationship between the 
rulers and the ruled. In reality, in a new state, state construction and regime 
building take place simultaneously. In Asia and Africa after the end of World 
War II, many societies threw off the yoke of empire and underwent their own 
independent state construction and regime building processes (Mengisteab 1997; 
Aspinall and Berger 2001; Abbay 2004).
State construction is a process of establishing statehood that consists of 
population, territory, and sovereignty. Externally, state construction begins 
with independence of statehood from external forces and involves the business 
of protecting the individuality of the state. The meaning of independence 
is particularly true in the non-western world. This is so because, as Jackson 
and Rosberg (1982) aptly note, in that world, state construction in terms of 
jurisdiction and international recognition preceded the internal process of 
forming a state. The formation of Westphalian states in Europe began with the 
line of nations, a process that is called nation-state formation, whereas state 
construction in Asia, and in Africa as well, began with liberation from the 
colonial rulers and with international recognition, even before the process of 
internally forming statehood. Even after international recognition of its statehood, 
therefore, state construction was an arduous process of struggles of exclusion and 
inclusion of certain nations or ethnic groups, a process that frequently involved 
instability and violence. 
State construction commonly requires the exercise of power to build up a 
bureaucracy, a tax system, and the military. In this process, many Asian countries, 
with the notable exceptions of mainland China and Japan, modeled themselves 
on their former colonial masters. Even those people who had fought the colonial 
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rulers relied on the vestiges of colonial states (Mamdani 2001; Cole and Kandiyoti 
2002; Young 2004). Myanmar’s Aung San and Korea’s Syngman Rhee are typical 
examples. Also, state construction in this case involved top-down penetration of 
power into all territorial, social, and ethnic peripheries. 
The construction of the new state was coupled with the first-ever regime 
building process. Regime connotes the political form of the state. There are many 
types of regimes. To name a few, authoritarian regime, military regime, monarchy, 
autocracy, and democracy are regime types. A regime has its own way of forming 
particular norms of ruling, legitimizing its rule, and disseminating a unique code 
of national security and public safety; in addition, it maintains particular rules 
for power succession or replacement. Once a regime is built, it may endure for 
a certain period of time. But the regime is normally changed and transformed, 
and an abrupt change of the regime is revolution or coup, a significant topic of 
analysis in the social sciences. While a state may persist, the regime may change 
over time. 
Whereas state construction is analytically different from regime building, 
the two processes take place at the same time during the first stage. If the newly 
emerging state apparatuses, such as the bureaucracy, taxation system, military, 
and police force, were challenged by indigenous elements such as communist 
insurgents or ethnic minorities, the state builders, who were simultaneously the 
first generation of regime builders, considered it their duty to protect the state 
apparatuses. They had no tolerance for challengers. In the event of challenges 
from those peripheries, they used violence to exterminate the challengers rather 
than simply teach them to obey their new-born regime’s rules and orders. 
It is noteworthy that the timing of independence and the ensuing state 
construction, paired with the initial regime building, is the most important 
factor. The international environment, i.e., the Cold War divide, was the key 
frame wherein those new states emerged. Many Asian states introduced Western-
style uniformed military forces, and these forces led, and defended, the new state. 
Certainly there were internal-external interactions. Internally, the leaders of 
state formation tried to make their best effort to penetrate into the peripheries, 
disallowing federation or autonomous systems. Externally, they saw the expanded 
U.S. influence in Asia after the end of the Pacific War. Their vision of a new 
state and the image of the real world were projected in their building of the first 
regime. In most cases, the consequence was the conflation of state construction 
and authoritarian and anticommunist regime building. (Exceptions were the 
northern parts of Korea and Vietnam, where communists took control of 
power following national division. A moderate exception was Indonesia, where 
the leader Sukarno took a socialist path.) The regime at that initial phase was 
characteristically dictatorial, mostly military-based, as well as anticommunist. 
The communists, along with ethnic minorities, became targets for elimination 
by the top power. They were considered not merely political challengers but also 
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a lethal threat to the establishment of the U.S.-sponsored state. This particular 
situation of conflation of state construction and anticommunist regime building 
conditioned brutal violence. 
At the time of conflation of the state construction and the autocratic-regime 
building, political leaders of an anticommunist persuasion were in accordance 
with the U.S. interests. Their efforts were concentrated on the protection of state 
security and defending the regime against communist insurgencies. In Korea 
and Vietnam, two contending states and rival regimes were formed during the 
period of liberation and independence. Syngman Rhee in South Korea led the 
building of the Republic of Korea in 1948 after three years of turmoil, and the 
regime under his leadership was autocratic, pro-U.S., and anticommunist; many 
important positions in the state apparatus were filled with former supporters of 
the Japanese colonial regime. In 1955, Ngo Dinh Diem became the first president 
of the Republic of Vietnam. The regime under Diem’s rule was autocratic and 
anticommunist and lasted for eight years with support from the United States. 
One difficult question is how to define the period of state construction, and 
of the first regime building within that state. The process of state construction 
normally takes more than just a few years, sometimes more than a decade. After 
independence, a formal declaration of state construction was not enough. What’s 
more, international recognition per se could not complete the process. The 
anticommunist counterinsurgency in Indonesia, which culminated between 1965 
through 1968, exemplified a long, grueling process of state construction involving 
mass killings of challengers, whether perceived or real. The current ethnic 
conflict in Myanmar shows that the business of the state construction is still 
incomplete. The two cases show an extremely long process, whereas most other 
Asian cases had a shorter period of state construction. As noted earlier, however, 
the declaration of independence and the ensuing international recognition 
preceded the completion of internal processes of exclusion and inclusion. 
Despite differences in length, there was usually a certain period of rivalry among 
important figures and between diverse local or ethnic forces. The course of 
pacification of challenging forces was characterized by brutal violence such as 
conspired assassinations, mass killings, and massacres. In those non-democracies, 
it was up to the top figures to define the time when the state construction was 
completed. As long as they felt threatened by challenges and they legitimized the 
violence, the process of state construction continued. Once they were convinced 
that the challenging forces, viewed as being detrimental to the foundation of the 
statehood, were exterminated, then they might believe that state construction 
was complete. The establishment of the state apparatuses (the bureaucracy, tax 
system, and the military) was never a sign that the process of state construction 
was completed. If state construction was slow and protracted, the result of the 
competition for the control of power was likely to be bloody violence targeting 
the challenging forces.
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In circumstances in which state construction and the first regime building 
are conflated, the modality of violence is normally extreme. “Instrumental 
violence” is the best way to characterize this modality (Cornell et al. 1996; 
Boudreau 2013). Like genocide or ethnic cleansing, violence associated with the 
conflation of state construction and regime building is intended to root out any 
challenging groups. Instrumental violence is neither intended to simply teach 
people a lesson about the new order nor to act as a warning that disobedience 
will be punished. Instrumental violence intends to “neutralize or displace a threat 
or challenge,” and thus it “directly disrupts, disaggregates, or eliminates political 
targets” (Boudreau 2013, 24). Instrumental violence uses every means available 
to eradicate those who threaten state security and the functioning of the state 
apparatuses.
The communist insurgencies active in the period after independence were 
seen as a grave threat to the forces of state construction and regime building. 
Counterinsurgency operations in Jeju, Korea, from 1947 to 1954 and in Indonesia 
between 1965 and 1968 are examples of instrumental violence that resulted in the 
deaths of innocent people as well as the insurgent groups (Kim 2009; Kammen 
2013). The forces of state construction did not simply mop up rebels but killed 
anyone they perceived to be rebels or rebel sympathizers, and even neutral 
bystanders. Obviously there was a perception gap between the state constructors 
and the victims. The state constructors perceived the entire community, from 
which rebels or perceived rebels came, as a peripheral zone that must be 
suppressed in order to preserve the security of the state and the newly forming 
regime. But the ordinary people—whether sympathizers or neutral bystanders—
did not see themselves as having anything to do with the insurgency per se. This 
implies a gap in perception between the perpetrators and victims about threat, 
order, and governance (Kim and Ganesan 2013, 8). 
Regardless of their real intentions or actual participation, members of an 
entire community may become targets of instrumental violence. For the leaders 
of state construction, there is no difference between the periphery of state 
sovereignty and a challenger to the emerging regime’s norm and legitimacy. In 
this circumstance, state security was considered the same as regime security. 
Challengers with different ideological backgrounds were frequently called 
“insurgents” and considered threats to statehood, as well as a contending 
force against the emerging regime’s norms and legitimacy. The forces of state 
construction did not hesitate to use instrumental violence to exterminate the 
challengers.
Inasmuch as challengers are considered elements of fatal danger to both the 
newly forming state and the first-ever regime, the violence against them is highly 
likely to be justified for a long period of time, and a verdict on it is unlikely to 
be reversed later. The challengers have already disappeared from the political 
scene, and thus they are no longer a contender for power. The conflation of state 
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construction and regime building has made the violence long forgotten and 
made victims and their families feel powerless. In this case, transitional justice, 
particularly finding truths and demanding accountability, is hard to be realized. 
However, if violence takes place during a certain regime’s power transition, but 
not in conjunction with state construction, there is a chance that transitional 
justice takes place when the violent regime ends. 
Longevity of the Violent Regime
Separately, longevity of the regime which committed the violence is another 
obstacle to transitional justice. A thirty-year span or one biological generation 
may become a baseline for dividing a long-lived regime for a short-lived regime. 
The biological generation is the average span of time between the birth of parents 
and that of their children, and the sociopolitical generation corresponds to a 
biological generation. As generations change over time, the new generation lives 
in an environment different from the parent generation, a situation that facilitates 
emergence of new institutions, norms, values, and memories. Counterintuitively, 
one generation is enough time for a violent regime to justify its brutal acts and 
institutionalize its powerbase that has abused human rights.
In Asia, longevity has mattered because of the long Cold War context in 
which most of the violence took place and it was legitimated. Just as the Cold 
War divide resulted in a particular form of conflation of state construction 
and regime building, so it justified for several decades—without transitional 
justice—the violence committed by the leaders who formed the state and built an 
anticommunist regime. The Jeju counterinsurgency in Korea, which continued 
from 1947 through 1954, is a prime example of a failure to realize justice for 
six decades, despite successive changes of regime. The Indonesian army’s 
counterinsurgency operation in 1965-1968, which took place at a time when the 
Vietnam War was escalating, has yet to be investigated (Sundhaussen 1982). The 
dominant ideology painted the victims as deserving their miserable fate even 
long after the violence was ended.
Even when there was no conflation of state construction and regime 
building, seeking truths and subsequent demands for accountability have been 
avoided in some instances of violence. The long duration of the violent regime 
is the main reason for this. There have been no serious efforts to enquire into 
truths about the “red drum” massacre in Phatthalung, Thailand, which took place 
in the early 1970s as an anticommunist operation (Haberkorn 2013a, 2013b). 
A contrasting case was the 1980 Kwangju incident in Korea, which initially was 
depicted in the government-controlled media as a riot instigated by “impure 
elements.” Thanks to the ensuing negotiated democratization process that started 
in 1987, the incident entered the stage of hearings and truth-finding in the 1990s 
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(Wang 1995; Ahn 2003; Choi 2005). In both Thailand and Korea, the violence 
was committed by military authoritarian regimes; however, the two countries 
took different paths because of the difference in the length of the violent regimes 
and the differing characteristics of international environment.
Certainly, longevity of the regime that committed the violence or its 
successor regime contributes to the delay in seeking and finding truths about 
the violence. Olsen, Payne, and Reiter (2010) also note this point. For the 
power holders, the challengers to their regime might be considered the same as 
contenders to the state as well, not to the regime alone. As shown in the earlier 
examples, the so-called communist insurgents are seen as targets for elimination 
in order to preserve the security of both the state and the regime. Since the 
competitors are excluded from the power contest—not to mention the removal 
of ethnic minorities on the periphery—the configuration of competition in the 
successor regimes is kept simple. However, competition is likely to occur within 
the inner circle, in the form of a military coup or palace revolution. Shifts in the 
leadership and the replacement of those at the top do not mean changes in the 
relationship between the rulers and the ruled. The replacement of personnel 
within the leadership does not bring about change in the rules and orders of the 
regime that define authority relations and the means of representation. In this 
regard, there is no substantial change in the characteristics of the regime. The 
replacement of top leaders may be followed by new institutional arrangements; 
however, as proponents of institutionalism maintain, old institutional constraints 
tend to prevail over these seemingly important new arrangements (North 1990, 
83-91). If the regime that committed the ruthless violence (and its successor 
regimes) lasts for a long period of time, it is likely that seeking truths and 
enquiring into accountability will be delayed even beyond democratic transition.
A long-lasting regime builds stable state apparatuses, particularly the 
military, the police, and the security agency. Evidence and documents are either 
concealed or destroyed. Impunity is the norm in these cases. In the period of 
transition, successor regimes, or some of their members, may admit that there 
was violence in the past. But they may try to argue that such violence was 
inevitable in order to protect the integrity of the state, and thus try to treat the 
victims as enemies of the regime (Philpott 2006, 17). They refuse to respond to 
victims’ demands for public disclosure of the evidence; the magnitude of the 
violence in the official account will differ from that in the accounts given by 
victims.
Those who were not killed are often closely monitored, and their movements 
restricted. Those who associate with these surviving victims are labeled 
subversives; their behavior is viewed as detrimental to the integrity of the state. 
The rulers may create a new space where discussion of past violence is allowed, 
but it is never permitted to become a public agenda item. The existence of 
this regulated space not only erases memories of the violence but also delays 
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resolution. A case in point is the behavior of the Chinese authorities, who have 
monitored discussion on social media of the 1989 Tiananmen incident, while at 
the same time permitting public discourse on the topic (Yang 2003; Abbott 2001; 
Kim and Ganesan 2013).
Whatever defense mechanisms the rulers choose, the longer the regime 
persists the less likely it is that past violence will become a public agenda item not 
only while that regime is in existence but also after democratic transition begins. 
This is because the old regime is able to institutionalize various aspects of its 
practices, including agencies of social control, personal leadership, and political 
exclusion (Garretón 1986, 160-63). Given this, civil society, even in an embryonic 
form, cannot emerge; advocacy groups cannot take root in such a society because 
of the regime’s surveillance and suppression.
It is noteworthy that regime longevity is not always coupled with conflation 
of state construction and regime building. In some instances, new regimes that 
emerge long after the completion of state construction may also be blamed 
for absence of transitional justice. For example, after state construction is 
accomplished, a military regime may rise to power and commit violent acts 
and manage to keep them quiet for a long period of time. The purpose of the 
violence would have been either to defend the regime, to cope with regime crisis, 
or to consolidate the regime. In any of these cases, the violence may not easily 
be addressed. This is true particularly when the regime, or its successor regime, 
persists long enough to institutionalize safety devices. The military regime in Brazil 
between 1964 and 1985 is an example. The military officers who seized power did 
so because they believed that the country was in crisis. The urgent objectives were 
national security and development, which they claimed were interdependent 
and thus related to state security. The military regime’s long duration, almost one 
generation, meant that the violence was ignored for years, even though it was 
not completely forgotten. Based on strengthened and institutionalized security 
agencies, the regime paved the way for a negotiated transition, and the military 
leaders gradually gave up their prerogatives (Stepan 1988, 103-14). Consequently, 
the successor regime, in the process of democratization, did not face up to past 
violence directly, but did so cautiously. This kind of negotiated transition took 
place in Korea as well. In Korea, the June 29 declaration of 1987, prepared by 
regime insiders, and the subsequent process of transition were based on the spirit 
of moderation shared by the military and the opposition forces in Korea (Bermeo 
1997).
Five Cases in Asia
Democratic transition might create an environment to open opportunities for a 
new society to confront the wrongdoings of the previous regime. As discussed 
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above, however, democratization is not always followed by transitional justice. 
Even in the event of democratization, the above-mentioned two factors—state-
regime building conflation and longevity of the violent regime—justify the 
violence. In principle, there are three types of mechanisms: amnesty, pardon, 
compensation, and reparation as minimalist mechanisms; truth-finding and 
hearings as moderate ones; and trial and imprisonment as maximalist ones (for 
these types, see Olsen, Payne, and Reiter 2010). The two factors rule out the 
possibility of the new regime’s adoption of even a moderate mechanism that 
requires truth-finding, thus bringing about impunity for the perpetrators. There 
may be conflict over “competing truths” where the past is concerned, to use 
Arenhövel’s term (Arenhövel 2008); however, the truths from victims’ perspective 
are unlikely to win.
There is one cautionary note. The form of democratic transition, to which 
some analysists pay special attention (De Brito, González-Enríquez, and Aguilar 
2001), has no real impact on the successor regime’s way of dealing with the 
past violence. A violent regime may either collapse suddenly or experience 
gradual transition. Sudden collapse draws a line under the violence, chiefly by 
the removal of the people in power, whereas gradual change is based on pacts 
and mutual concessions between the regime in power and the opposition forces. 
Collapse is best exemplified by the fall of Imperial Japan and the drastic changes 
that took place in Eastern Europe, whereas examples of gradual transition 
include the democratization process in Korea and to some extent Thailand and 
Indonesia. However, whatever the form of the transition may be, the conflation 
of state construction and regime building and the longevity of the violent regime 
are the determinants to prohibit a society in transition from seeking truths about 
Table 2. Five Cases






Jeju, Korea, 1947-54 
(long-delayed truth-finding, but 
impunity for perpetrators)
Indonesia, 1965-68 




(investigation, but impunity for 
perpetrators)
Short Unsuccessful TJ
Imperial Japan, 1945 
(early support for war-dead, but 
impunity for perpetrators)
Successful TJ
Kwangju, Korea, 1980 
(truth-finding, hearing, trial, 
pardon)
Source: Author
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past violence and holding the perpetrators accountable. In this case, impunity is 
normal for the perpetrators (see Table 2). 
Indonesia 
The Indonesian counterinsurgency operation was an example of instrumental, 
categorical violence that took place at a time when the protracted state-building 
process was accompanied by anticommunist regime building. Sukarno declared 
independence in August 1945, thus launching the process of state construction; 
however, the Netherlands tried to reinstate its power, and conflict ensued until 
they formally recognized the independence in December 1947. Indonesia also 
encountered difficulties politically in the process of integrating its vast territory 
and diverse social groups—consisting of six thousand inhabited islands and 
hundreds of ethnic groups. It is notable that the construction of the state was 
protracted, taking two decades following independence. The important state 
apparatus, particularly the military, was not under the control of the top leader. 
Coinciding with a gradual decline in Sukarno’s power and a shift of power to 
General Suharto, the counterinsurgency operation carried out by the army and 
the anticommunist militia continued from 1965 through 1968. The operation 
mopped up members of the Indonesian Communist Party and their sympathizers, 
many of whom were perceived enemies rather than real insurgents. The number 
of victims reached a million, and the counterinsurgency used instrumental 
violence, not to teach them a lesson but to root them out (International Center 
for Transitional Justice and KontraS 2011). The attack on the communists was 
carried out under loose and divided military leadership and it developed into a 
broader attack by General Suharto on Sukarno and Sukarnoism (Kammen 2013, 
179-80). It is fair to say that the waves of violence that swept the archipelago 
were part of the extended state-construction process. This state construction was 
conflated with the rise and consolidation of the anticommunist regime. In the 
eyes of the army and its allies, the regions and communities where communists 
and their collaborators prevailed were a periphery that needed to be eradicated 
(McGregor 2009). For Suharto’s army and its affiliates, the counterinsurgency 
operation was a fight for legitimacy and integrity of the foundation of the state as 
well as the anticommunist regime. 
The end of the violent regime in 1998 and the subsequent, gradual change to 
democracy over the course of two decades has not been followed by a meaningful 
initiative by the new regime to inact truth-finding and accountability regarding 
the mass killings in the 1960s. Suharto stepped down in May 1998, and after that 
human rights advocacy groups lobbied the transitional regime under Habibie, 
Wahid, and Megawati to introduce the Law on the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC), which was eventually passed in 2004. But the Constitutional 
Court ruled the TRC law unconstitutional, a decision that was clearly political 
rather than legal. Furthermore, despite efforts by international and domestic 
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advocacy groups to get the post-Suharto regime to enquire into truths, progress 
was blocked by a systematic unwillingness to unearth the truth about the past. 
The truth-finding enquiries have been obstructed by the return to power of 
former security officials and the appointment of individuals who lack objectivity 
(International Center for Transitional Justice 2005; International Center for 
Transitional Justice and KontraS 2011).
It is worth noting that the conflation of state construction and regime 
building is not the only reason for the failure to enquire into truths and 
accountability. This failure should be attributed to the longevity of the Suharto 
regime (1967-1998) as well. Suharto’s three-decade-long rule, which began at a 
time of escalating conflict in Indochina and extended into the post-Cold War 
period, contributed to the institutionalization of the security apparatus which 
protected the perpetrators of the atrocities, despite calls for justice from the 
victims and advocacy groups. The gradual and negotiated transition to democracy 
has been successful, but the longevity of the old regime has rendered even a 
moderate mechanism such as truth-finding and reconciliation unworkable.
Korea 
The two cases in Korea—the violent suppression in Jeju (1947-1954), and the 
Kwangju incident (1980)—are contrasting examples of confronting past violence 
in one country. First of all, the Jeju incident was a typical case of violence 
perpetrated during the period of conflation of state construction and regime 
building. The violent regime and its successor regimes persisted long enough for 
public memories of the event to fade. The main instigators and perpetrators of 
the bloody operation, or those who held important posts in the military or the 
civilian administration under the authoritarian regime, were dead by the time 
Korea embarked upon democratization in 1987. For more than fifty years, the 
mass killing was viewed as a legitimate military operation aimed to suppress 
communist insurgents who challenged the foundation of the new state and its 
government (Kim 2009; Huh 2010, 2011).
The Jeju incident began with police opening fire on civilians in March 
1947, at a time when the U.S. Military Government in Korea was supporting 
the conservative and anticommunist political figures in Syngman Rhee’s circle 
who were preparing to establish the Republic of Korea (South Korea). The mass 
killing occurred in 1948 when the National Constabulary was conducting a mop-
up operation on Jeju Island to root out communists, their family members, and 
so-called sympathizers. The communist insurgents were trying to obstruct the 
general election scheduled for May for the composition of the constitutional 
national assembly; however, many people with no such political agenda became 
victims. With the outbreak of the Korean War (1950-1953), many more civilians 
again became the target of violence perpetrated by the army and the police. The 
dead and the missing numbered twenty-five to thirty thousand (Huh 2010, 285).
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The formal truth-finding mechanism regarding the Jeju incident ended up 
with a symbolic reconciliation without any concrete measure of accountability. 
With the passing of the Special Law for Truth-finding and Honoring the 
Victims of the Jeju April 3 Incident in 2000, these events were given a new 
interpretation—“an incident in which civilians were victimized amid armed 
clashes and operations” (Article 2 of the Law) rather than the suppression of a 
communist insurgency. The truth-finding committee began the work of restoring 
the good name of the victims and established a peace park on the island in their 
honor. In 2003, President Roh Moo-hyun apologized to the victims for the abuse 
of state power at the time of the incident. But the truth-finding law itself failed to 
authorize the committee to investigate the perpetrators and provide victims and 
their families with reparations. Democratization and the process of democratic 
consolidation helped to uncover the past violence, but the conflation of state 
construction and regime building and the lengthy duration of the authoritarian 
regime brought about impunity for the perpetrators. Most witnesses had already 
passed away, and those organizations that were involved in the violence still 
exercised influence over the committee (Kim 2014, 252-55). 
In contrast to the Jeju case, the short duration of the violent military regime, 
which committed killings in in May 1980 in Kwangju, contributed to achieving 
full scale transitional justice. The incident took place when a new military 
regime rose to power, but it was not conflated with state construction in Korea. 
After achieving transitional justice, the events of May 18, 1980 in Kwangju are 
now remembered as a democratic movement. Right after the assassination of 
general-turned-president Park Chung-hee in 1979, the new group within the 
army centered on Major General Chun Doo-hwan led a mutiny aimed at seizing 
control of the army. In the following year, this group set about suppressing critics 
and expanded its power and eventually carried out indiscriminative killings in 
Kwangju. The consolidation of Chun’s military regime had nothing to do with 
the protection of the foundation of the state, even though the regime called the 
situation a state emergency and branded the protesters as “impure elements” 
(Jameson 2000, 84). As the military regime faced strong opposition from the 
alliance of citizens and opposition party leaders, Chun Doo-hwan and his 
colleague Roh Tae-woo gradually transferred power to civilians through a two-
step process: first, a negotiated pact in 1987, and then a full transfer of authority 
to a civilian politician, Kim Young-sam, after the 1992 presidential election. 
Transitional justice with regard to the May 18 violence used a combination of 
diverse mechanisms—including reparations, trials, hearings, and amnesty. This 
is a model case of hybrid transitional justice. It proceeded peacefully with little 
intimidation by members of the old order or any back pedaling. 
Thailand
The brutal burning alive of civilians in the “red drum” (old oil drum) in Thailand’s 
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Phatthalung Province between 1971 and 1975 was covered up for three decades. 
The red drum killings were brought to public attention only after the death of 
the military dictator Thanom Kittikachom in 2003. The longevity of the violent 
military regime (three decades) has left the case unresolved even after the country 
started incremental changes toward democracy. The red drum violence did not 
take place in the context of conflation of state construction and regime building, 
but it was a consequence of an anticommunist military regime’s repression of 
communist sympathizers and innocent villagers at the height of conflict in 
Indochina. Indeed, the Thanom regime was one of a series of military regimes 
that held power under the Thai constitutional monarchy, which was inaugurated 
in 1932, and the regime’s offence was for the purpose of maintaining the order of 
anticommunist military rule. 
Research based on U.S. archival sources reveals that General Sant 
Chitpatima, the commander of the Fifth Military Circle and the regional 
commander in charge of the Mid-South Region, was responsible for the killings. 
This study also revealed that the United States was aware of the brutal crack-
down on the villagers. The Thai military command used the Vietnam War as 
justification for the brutal anticommunist operation, while the United States kept 
silent and allegedly even supported it (Zipple 2014, 98-101). Most of the civilian 
victims were branded communist terrorists or their supporters. They were 
victims of armed clashes between the army and the then illegal Communist Party 
of Thailand (CPT), as one survivor testifies: 
What can villagers like us do when we are sandwiched between the government 
officials and the CPT? If we refused to cooperate with either side we would be in 
great danger. Taking sides with the CPT seemed to be the best way to survive in 
the circumstances when the police and security officers could not provide us with 
protection and everything was a real mess (Bangkok Post Special Publication 2003).
The red drum killings in Thailand have certain things in common with 
the Jeju incident in Korea and the counterinsurgency in Indonesia. A major 
difference is that in the Korean and Indonesian cases, instrumental violence was 
used at a time of conflation of state construction and regime building, whereas 
the red drum killings were intended to teach the villagers an anticommunist 
lesson. In terms of modality, the red drum killings were not an example of 
instrumental violence that is normally aimed at exterminating the entirety of the 
targeted group.
Because of the subsequent absence of serious investigation and truth-finding 
measures, General Sant and the other alleged perpetrators got away with the 
massacre of about 3,000 people. During a brief period of democracy from 1973 
to 1976, members of a pro-democracy group, the Student Federation of Thailand, 
visited the villages concerned and tried to collect information. The army 
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disrupted the fact-finding activity, and the victims’ relatives were too afraid to 
speak out. Even after the media highlighted the killings in 2003, the government 
under democratic transition was still unwilling to carry out a serious investigation 
and instead continued to justify the killings as an anticommunist operation 
(Haberkorn 2013a). Even during the democratization process, both the violent 
military’s power during the long Cold War divide and its enduring influence in 
politics, which was due to its loyalty to the monarchy, were the primary reason 
for the absence of transitional justice with regard to military-led violence.
Japan
The killings of Okinawans by the Japanese army took place during the final stage 
of the Pacific War, and defeat in that war triggered the collapse of the regime 
and political transition (De Brito, González-Enríquez, and Aguilar 2001, 11). 
Although the postwar democratic government might have been assumed to have 
an opportunity to investigate the incident, the Okinawa killings did not become 
a public agenda item for the entire duration of the Cold War. The presence of the 
U.S. military administration from 1945 to 1972 and the continued presence of U.S. 
forces since then delayed the emergence of an Okinawan identity. The security 
of Japan and its alliance with the United States were the most important issues 
for anticommunist policymakers. The Okinawan case is another example of the 
negative impact of the Cold War divide on the thorough resolution of violence 
perpetrated by the state on its own citizens. The government’s reparation scheme 
in the 1950s distorted memories of the Okinawa incident. Only victims who 
acknowledged that the violence had been carried out in the service of national 
defense were able to receive war reparations. In this context, deaths at the hands 
of the Imperial Army were interpreted as a heroic sacrifice for their country; 
there were no perpetrators or victims of state violence. To make matters worse, 
since the 1980s, the government’s revisionist interpretation of the incident depicts 
it as a case of “mass suicide.” According to the official version, there was no state-
led violence at all (Nozaki 2008). 
In sum, Imperial Japan’s violence on its own citizens was committed in the 
name of preserving the foundation of statehood centered on Emperor Hirohito. 
The rise of the postwar democratic regime meant a break from the wartime 
regime, but the survival of the state per se and the rehabilitation of the former 
wartime politicians at the height of Cold War meant continuity of statehood 
passing through wartime and postwar periods. Given this situation, postwar 
Japan treated the Okinawan victims as wartime dead and servants of the state, 
and made the refusal of truth-finding and provision of impunity to perpetrators 
inevitable. 
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Conclusion
This article has addressed the question of why some cases of state violence 
against citizens in Asia are not followed by a process of enquiring into truths and 
demanding accountability even during a democratic transition. It has shown, 
first, the conflation of state construction and regime building impedes that 
process. Victims of violence in this circumstance are normally ignored long after 
the violence has taken place, and the perpetrators get off scot-free. When the 
violence is taking place, victims are regarded as part of the periphery and a threat 
to state security, and as such they are legitimate targets for elimination through 
instrumental violence. After the violence, their associates and sympathizers are 
monitored by the regime in power. With institutionalized security agencies, the 
new regime in transition provides impunity to the alleged perpetrators even in 
the case of adopting truth-finding procedures. Second, the longevity of the regime 
that committed the violence and its successor regimes—even in the absence of a 
conflation of state construction and regime building—tends to hinder attempts to 
seek truths and accountability about the past even during a democratic transition.
Additionally, this article has shown that the form of the political transition, 
whether negotiated gradual transition or sudden collapse, does not really 
matter at the bifurcation point, whether seeking truths or giving impunity 
to perpetrators. Of the five cases, the Kwangju incident provides a model of 
successful transitional justice: gradual progress without social division, and a 
combination of minimalist, moderate, and maximalist mechanisms. I underscore 
that the success should not be attributed to the gradual political transition, but to 
the short lifespan of the violent regime. 
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